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Sluggish Money Growth:
Japan's Recent Experience
Examination of Chart 1 suggests that monetary
developments in the second half of the 1980s
may be divided into three distinct periods. In the
first period, 1986 to mid-1989, monetary policy
eased considerably; the call money rate declined
from a peak of 6.9 percent to an average of 5.5
percent, and money growth accelerated to an
average of 10 percent annually, compared to 8.3
percent from 1981 to1985. In the second period,
frommid-1989 to mid-1991, policy tightened; the
call money rate rose to a peak of 8.2 percent and
broad money growth responded with a lag, rising
to a \vithin-period peak of 8.4 percentin July
1990, and then declining sharply. In the third
period, from mid-1991 to the present, monetary
policy eased and the call money rate again fell
sharply. However, as the Chart vividly illustrates,
money growth has remained sluggish, growing at
an average ofaround 2.5 percent up to the middle
of this year, and most recently declining. Such
sluggish money growth has not been observed
during past recessions identified in the Chart.
After years of being the fastest growing among
the major industrial economies, Japan appears to
be in the midst of a cyclical downturn. Growth
h~<; slowed from 5.2 percent in 1990 (year-over-
year) to 4.5 percent in 1991, and the OECD fore-
casts that 1992 will come in at 1.8 percent. Such
moderate growth is generally associated with
recessions in japan (see Weekly Letter 92-10).
In response to the slowdown in economic ac-
tivity, japanese monetary policy began to ease in
the middle of 1991, and since then, japanese in-
terest rates have declined sharply. Despite lower
interest rates, however, growth of broad money
has not picked up.
This Weekly Letter discusses the recent behavior
of money and interest rates in japan, and argues
that an important reason for the sluggish money
growth is the sharp decline in asset prices. An
examination of this issue is of interest for at least
two reasons. First, sluggish money growth in ja-
pan may signal a weak recovery there; this could
affect the u.s. economy because robust growth
in japan has been an important source of eco-
nomic stimulus in the u.s. in recent years, by
directly or indirectly boosting the demand for
u.s. exports. Second, japan's recent experience
may shed light on the factors that have recently
contributed to slow money growth in the u.s.
Monetary cycles and asset prices
To provide some historical perspective, Chart 1
illustrates the behavior of a short-term market
rate of interest (the call money rate) and broad
money (M2+CD) growth in japan from 1981 to
1992. Shaded areas define peak-to-trough dates
for earlierrecessions as defined by the Economic
Planning Agency (EPA) ofjapan. We have added
the vertical line in February 1991 as a potential
peak identified by an index of economic activity
(diffusion index) that is also used by the EPA in
dating recessions. In Chart 1, the call money rate
can be interpreted as an indicator of the mone-
tary policy stance as it is reflected in short-term
credit conditions, while the growth of broad
money illustrates how such a stance is reflected
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-1For reasons that are not entirely clear, Japan's
recent monetary cycle has been associated with
sharp fluctuations in asset prices. Paralleling the
easing of monetary policy, urban land prices
increased two and a half times in major urban
areas between,1985 and 1988, in large part due
to a surge in investment in residential apartment
buildings. Consumer price inflation, however,
remained moderate. Therefore, the monetary
easing in the second half of the 1980s has been
associated with significant "asset price inflation"
in Japan. Likewise, the monetary tightening from
mid-1989 to mid-1991 has been associated with
a correspondingly sharp deflation in asset prices.
According to a recent Japanese government sur-
vey, real estate prices in major urban centers
plunged 15 percent this year, and land prices in
Tokyo and Osaka are now respectively 20 and
40percent off their peaks. Declines in land
prices have not been observed inJapan since
the mid-1970s.
A similar pattern of volatility is apparent in the
behavior of stock prices. The Nikkei stock market
index doubled from below 19,000 in 1987 to a
peak of 38,000 in December 1989. The index fell
steadily after December 1989, and began to drop
steeply in 1992 to a low of 14,300 in August. It
was trading above 17,300 in early December.
Such a steep decline in Japan's stock index is
unprecedented.
Explaining sluggish money growth
There are two ways of assessing the behavior of
monetary aggregates. One may focus on the lia-
bility side ofthe bank balance sheet and analyze
the behavior of money demand. Alternatively,
one may focus on the asset side and analyze
factors that may influence bankcredit, which
in turn is reflected in the behavior of monetary
aggregates. This Weekly focuses on bank credit
behavior.
As is apparent from Chart 1, the recent slowdown
in broad money growth is very unusual, especially
given prevailing interest rates. Compared to other
postwar recessions in Japan, the current eco-
nomic slowdown is not unusually severe (in
terms ofoutput growth or unemployment), so the
sluggish money growth cannot be fully explained
by the weakness in credit demand that is typi-
cally associated with a cyclical downturn. Thus,
some' other factor appears to be dampening the
growth in money and credit.
One possible explanation for unusually sluggish
money growth is that the decline in asset prices
has contributed. to unusually 'vveak demand for
credit. Demand for credit in the real estate sector
may be unusually weak because the sharp de-
clines in real estate values have left developers
unable or unwilling to seek new loans. In theory,
this should not prevent borrowing by other inves-
tors who take advantage of sharply reduced real
estate prices. However, other investors may be
reluctant to acquire real estate even at the sharply
reduced prices currently prevailing if they are less
familiar with real estate markets than are existing
developers, or are concerned that real estate val-
ues may fall further.
Demand for credit in the corporate sector also
may be unusually weak. To see why, note that
the stock market boom ofthe second half ofthe
1980s provided a very cheap source of funds for
Japanese firms. This had three effects that now
may be dampening the demand for credit in the
corporate sector more than usual for a period of
slow growth. First, cheap funds stimulated an
earlier investment boom. As a result, firms may
now be satisfied with existing levels of capacity
and therefore reluctant to engage in much addi-
tional investment or borrowing even if economic
activity picks up. Second, in the late 1980s Jap-
anese firms issued a large volume of bonds
allowing investors the option to convert these
into equity (warrants). Due to the recent decline
in stock prices, these options have not been ex-
ercised, and corporations may have to borrow to
redeem these bonds as they mature. This may
make corporations reluctant to engage in addi-
tional borrowing. Third, Japanese firms accumu-
lated large amounts of liquidity when money was
cheap in the late 1980s: corporate holding of
cash, deposits, and short term securities in
March 1992 were equivalent to 1.7 months of
sales, down from a peak of 2.0 in 1990, but still
above the average of 1.2 during the first half of
the 1980s. This liquidity dampens desire for addi-
tional credit.
A credit crunch?
Aside from contributing to unusually weak credit
demand, the decline in asset prices may have
made banks reluctant to extend new loans be-
cause of capital constraints, a situation that has
been described as contributing to a "credit
crunch" in the U.S. context.
In 1988, Japan's Ministry of Finance announced
its intention to require Japanese banks to main-
tain a certain ratio of capital to risk-adjusted
assets, in conformity with international bank
capital standards agreed to at Basle. These cap-
ital adequacy standards require that Japanesebanks to reap realized capital gains as well as
the magnitude of unrealized capital gains.
Finally, the stock market decline has made it less
attractive for japanese banks to issue new equity
to shore up their Tier One capital. (However,
banks have had some success strengthening Tier
Two capital by issuing subordinated debt.)
In spite of these various pressures on the capital
position of japanese banks, the latest data indi-
cate that japanese banks are successfully meet-
ing the capital standards agreed to at Basle.
However, these pressures may have contributed
to the sluggish growth in money and lending,
particularly in the face of continuing uncertainty
about the trends in asset prices.
Conclusions
Asset price deflation appears to have contributed
to unusual weakness in the demand for credit in
japan. In combination with increased capital re-
quirements, asset price deflation also may have
contributed to a reduction in the supply of bank
credit. Taken together, weak demand for and
supply of credit due to falling asset prices help
explain unusually weak growth in the monetary
aggregate, M2+CD. However, further empirical
analysis is needed to determine whether it is






Will weak money growth hinder economic recov-
ery in Japan? A number of factors mitigate this
concern. Deposits in the postal savings system,
which are a relatively close substitute for money,
have been growing at a rapid rate, so the sluggish
growth in broad money to some extent overstates
the extent of monetary contraction in the econ-
omy. japanese corporations have also been
holding relatively large amounts of liquid assets,
which reduces their vulnerability to any con-
straints japanese banks may face in increasing
the supply of credit. Finally, Japan has great lee-
way to offset contractionary influences by stimu2'
lating the economy through fiscal policy, as is ev-
ident in the recently unveiled plan to increase
government spending.
Second, japanese banks hold close to 20 percent
of outstanding corporate shares, making them
collectively among the largest shareholders (see
Weekly Letter 91-13). During the stock market
boom, Japanese banks could sell these stocks
and realize substantial capital gains that they
could use to increase Tier One capital and sup-
port increased lending. (For institutional reasons,
the extent to which japanese banks sold shares
was limited.) Alternatively, japanese banks could
hold the stocks, and count 45 percent of the un-
realized capital gains on these holdings as Tier
Two capital under the Basle risk-based capital
requirements. However, the steep drop in share
prices has significantly reduced the ability of
banks achieve an overall capital-asset ratio equal
to at least 8 percent by March 31, 1993. Bank
canital consists of Tier One capital. mainlv
sh~reholders'funds and retained earningS; and
Tier Two capital, which includes subordinated
debt, preferred shares, and "hidden" assets, that
is, unrealized capital gains. To satisfy the 8 per-
cent ratio, at least half of bank capital must be
Tier One capital. These requirements are more
stringent than those provided for by earlier jap-
anese banking law, which imposed weaker links
between total assets and the amount of capital
held.
Because of the new capital requirements, in-
creases in bank loans must now be backed by
increases in bank capital. However, asset price
deflation has weakened the capital position of
Japanese banks in several ways. First, the col-
lapse of the real estate market has saddled
Japanese banks with a growing burden of non-
performing loans. According to the Ministry of
Finance estimate,nonperforming loans held
by the 21 largest banksrose from¥8 trillion at
March 31, 1992 to ¥12.3 trillion ($103 billion)
at the end of September 1992. This is about 2
percent of total bank loans outstanding. Private
sector analysts estimate that problem loans held
by the financial sector may in the future turn out
to be several orders of magnitude larger. Loan
loss reserves, on the other hand, are equivalent
to only 0.8 percent of banks' outstanding loans.
To the extent that banks have to absorb losses on
nonperforming loans, they cannot replenish their
capital and instead have to cut back on lending.
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